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LESSONS FROM THE PAST: REVENGE YESTERDAY
AND TODAY
TAMAR FRANKEL*
Professor Seipp's Paper transports us to the Middle Ages to discover a
society that views crime and tort quite differently from the way we view
these categories today. Yet our discovery of that society offers a perspec-
tive about our own. In Professor Seipp's world the victim of a wrong had
a choice: demand revenge by determining how the wrongdoer would be
punished, or demand monetary compensation. These two entitlements
were mutually exclusive. The victim could choose either one, but to some
extent, especially in earlier times, the right of revenge was considered a
higher right that the victim was expected to exercise, and sometimes even
to administer. This view of revenge as a higher right may have reflected
the mores of the community,' exerting pressure on the victim to exercise
the right.
Let us return to the present and ask two questions. First, how and why
have we changed the Middle Ages revenge-based system of dealing with
wrongs? Second, how much of the underlying revenge motif of the past
do we still carry with us today?
I. How HAVE WE CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE AGES?
Our legal system has parted ways with the system of the Middle Ages
in two fundamental respects: the decline of the victim's right to revenge,
and the ascent of monetary and compensatory damages. Today's society
generally considers the right to revenge as uncivilized and perhaps even
un-Christian.2 The law reflects this disapproval by depriving a crime vic-
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am indebted to my
colleague, Professor Hugh Baxter, for his ideas and guidance, and to my research
assistant, David Van Why, for his thorough research and thoughtful comments.
1 David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common
Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 63-64 (1996).
2 Contrast the medieval church's approval of vengeance, as noted in id. at 63 n.27
and accompanying text, with modem Christianity's general disapproval of such be-
havior:
The critical, and often overlooked, movement of the destruction of enemy psalms
[i.e., Psalms 109 and 137,] is this yielding of vengeance to God, and this will have
to be the driving idea behind the sermons they spawn. There will be no 'que sera,
sera,' spiritual resignation, but rather, an honest assessment of who may legiti-
mately exercise which powers. The greatest faith finally yields all powers to the
Lord, and trusts that God will ultimately keep covenant in God's own way.
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tim of the right to determine the wrongdoer's punishment. Unlike in the
Middle Ages, punishing criminal acts today lies exclusively within the do-
main of the state.' As a result, a crime is no longer viewed as a wrong
against the victim alone, but as a wrong against society as a whole.4 Thus,
today a victim is excluded from the process of punishing the wrongdoer.
The victim's only option is to sue for compensation in separate civil court
proceedings.5
Stephen A.H. Wright, Violent Vengeance in the Psalms: Can it Possibly Preach?, 14 J.
FOR PREACHERS 16, 21 (1991).
3 "As Hegel appreciated, the modem state is the citizenry's moral representative;
in the face of pluralism and religious controversy, it is the only institutional voice of
the community's shared moral values." Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus
Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1694 (1992).
4 See GEORGE SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 364 (Tom Bottomore &
David Frisby trans., 1978) (1907) (asserting that the focus on the wrongdoer is the
result of the state's takeover of the criminal justice system, because when the state
takes over, criminal offenses are deemed "a disturbance of public order or a violation
of an ethical-religious law," not merely offenses against the victims).
Courts may imply a private right of action for the victim from the existence of a
criminal prohibition. This right, however, constitutes a private civil action that enti-
tes the victim only to compensation, not to determine the criminal punishment.
5 We should distinguish between revenge and just deserts. Both revenge and just
deserts require that wrongdoers "pay" for their wrongdoings, and both represent a
demand for retribution. The distinction between the two lies in the number and di-
versity of people to whom the punishment would be acceptable. Revenge is "pay-
ment" that would satisfy or appease the victim and at most the victim's community; it
is a demand for personal retribution. Just deserts is "payment" that would satisfy or
appease far more people, not only those closely connected to the wrong. It is a de-
mand for less personal and more societal retribution. A just desert can be analogized
to a market price-the aggregate retributive value that numerous people put on pun-
ishment for a certain wrong, for a variety of reasons. Revenge, in contrast, is the
retributive value that one or few people put on a certain punishment for a certain
wrong. Both revenge and just deserts can deter certain behaviors. The current law
has reduced the legitimacy and (at least) the intensity of the desire for revenge of the
victims and their close communities by transferring the right to revenge from them to
the state.
When a court sentences a convicted wrongdoer, the court denounces the wrong-
doer's act on behalf of society. Society's denunciation of a criminal act serves to "di-
rect community anger away from vengeance." Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral
Right to Punish, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 332 (1990). Society's revenge is thus trans-
formed into just deserts. At times, however, this desire or anger is transferred to
another group (e.g., the police), sometimes with tragic results. The legitimacy of po-
lice hatred and pursuit of punishment for law breakers, if not shared by large seg-
ments of the population, can be viewed as revenge rather than just deserts.
Long before a distinct system of torts and crimes emerged, communities sought to
resolve disputes by compensating victims monetarily. This practice evolved from a
desire to avoid the blood feuds that were the principal form of dispute resolution up
to the Middle Ages. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The End of the Law as Developed in
[Vol. 76:89
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
The second fundamental change in our society since the Middle Ages is
the ascent of money. The main form of wealth is no longer land but mon-
ey and its equivalents. While land presents the image of personal and
subjective sovereignty, money presents the image of impersonal and ob-
jective power. Money allows us to compare peoples' wealth and earning
power, and to equalize losses caused by similar actions. Money also al-
lows us to convert otherwise unique persons and actions into identical
units,6 thus providing a common denominator for people, actions, and the
consequences of the rules of law.7 In any event, today monetary fines
and compensation seem far more valuable than in the past, and their na-
ture negates many characteristics of revenge.
II. WHY HAVE WE MADE THIS SHIFr?
A. From the Model of Personal, Subjective, and Non-Uniform Law to
Impersonal, Objective, and Uniform Law
I believe that the decline of the victim's right to revenge represents a
Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 199 (1914) ("To establish this peace-
able ordering [of society] two tasks had to be undertaken, (1) to regulate self help and
ultimately supersede it, (2) to prevent aggression.").
Arguably, just deserts, because it is supported by more people, may have a greater
deterrent effect. See, e.g., Bill Bradley, America's Efforts to Curb Violence: The Anti-
Crime Bill Is Not Enough, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, Nov. 1994, at 30, 33 (denouncing
violence as a means of deterrence but using the language of revenge: "Every person
who uses violence must pay the price in lost freedom, and 'doing time,' especially for
the young, must be a memory that one doesn't ever want to repeat").
6 See SIMMEL, supra note 4, at 359. Consider also the following statement in con-
nection with the valuation of human life:
If the same object is valued differently in different cases and by different persons,
then the whole valuation appears as a subjective process which consequently pro-
duces different results according to personal circumstances and dispositions. If,
however, the object is valued equally by different persons, the conclusion seems
unavoidable that the object is worth that much.
Id. If the life of the deceased is measured by the value or utility of the person to his
relatives, the value is personal to them and is subjective. If, however, human life
attains a value inherent in the person, then all people attain the same value, of human
beings. The same rationale applies to the use of money as compared to revenge. To
be sure, the use of money as punishment can be traced to vengeance. E.g., id. at 363
(noting that punishment is designed both to protect society and to indemnify society
for the damage done to it). Yet, when tracing fines to vengeance, Simmel argues that
in addition to these two objectives, or perhaps because of their ancient origins, pun-
ishment "has become satisfactory in itself, and has given rise to an impulse that is
independent of its utilitarian roots." Id.
7 An early example of the use of monetary sanctions as a substitute for vengeance
appears in Anglo-Saxon proceedings. In many cases, courts settled disputes by mak-
ing wrongdoers pay compensation ("bot") to the victim and a fine ("wite") to the
king. E.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the
Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1970).
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shift from the model of the "rule of man," which is personal, subjective,
and non-uniform, to the model of the "rule of law," which is impersonal,
objective, and relatively uniform. Under the "rule of man" model, judges
or rulers can use their discretion to determine the law, and, at their plea-
sure, mete out different rules to similar parties or classes of parties.'
Under the "rule of law" model, judges or rulers must follow general prin-
ciples or standards, and may not change the law for particular persons or
classes of persons except as permitted by law and rationalized on non-
arbitrary grounds. Thus, although these models do not fully reflect reali-
ty, most of us believe that the "rule of law" reduces the influence of the
unique characteristics of the judge or ruler and of the parties.9
The historic right of victims to choose the wrongdoer's punishment10
resulted in rules that depended on, and were shaped by, the sense of jus-
tice and personal standards of victims and their close communities. 1 ' The
law of revenge provided personal satisfaction for victims. Whether a
court punished or ordered compensation depended on the character of
both the victim and the immediate community, and the prior relationship
of both with the wrongdoer. So long as this personal right was recognized
and no other standards for punishment were imposed, the measure of
punishment could not be uniform. Moreover, because the victims could
choose compensation in lieu of revenge, the right to compensation and
the standards for compensation were also not uniform.
This regime rendered the law unpredictable. Not only did punishment
depend on the subjective desires of the victim, but deterrence was also
tied to the victim's feelings and not to the character of the wrongful act.
Although a wrongdoer could not always choose his victim to avoid cruel
punishment or exorbitant demands for compensation, in small communi-
ties where people knew each other well, they could predict who would
exact harsh penalties and who would not. In this way, the mere reputa-
tion of people for cruelty could deter wrongful acts against their person
8 See generally Dean J. Spader, Rule of Law v. Rule of Man: The Search for the
Golden Zigzag Between Conflicting Fundamental Values, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 379 (1984)
(laying out an analysis of the conflict between law and discretion).
9 Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157,
185-86 (1986) (comparing the effect of the rule of law with the rule of man in criminal
sentencing, and noting that although the rule of law results in equality, predictability,
and uniformity, the rule of man allows more flexibility, individualization, and creativi-
ty in sentencing). See generally Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of
Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941 (1995) (focusing on the institu-
tional constraints over judges).
10 See Pound, supra note 5, at 202 (stating that under archaic law, punishment for a
crime depended on the "extent of the desire for vengeance awakened" in the victim).
1 Id. (noting that the goal of the law of revenge was to "satisfy the desire for
vengeance of the individual who might not now help himself").
[Vol. 76:89
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and property. 12 Deterrence was therefore personal, subjective, and non-
uniform, depending on the victim's and the wrongdoer's personalities and
preferences, and perhaps on their relationship.
Today, the accepted wisdom is that: non-uniform and unpredictable
punishments lose some of their deterrent effect. For example, if potential
criminals can hope-even if they do not know for certain-to be paroled
after a short period of incarceration, they will not be as effectively de-
terred from criminal action as they would be if they expected to serve
their full sentences.' 3
Uniformity requires generalization and reduces the focus on individu-
als, both wrongdoers and victims. The theories of rehabilitation and re-
tributive justice result in a less uniform law, because both theories focus
on the particular wrongdoer. Yet, if such theories were adopted and ap-
plied uniformly, punishments would not fit the wrongdoers.
In addition, effective deterrence arguably depends on the public's faith
that the system will consistently punish criminals according to the law.
This belief led Congress to pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,'4
which was enacted as a response to the drastically different penalties that
federal courts imposed for similar crimes.'5 Thus, uniformity of sentenc-
ing has become a goal in itself along with honesty and just deserts. 16 The
law of revenge resulted in unfair treatment of offenders by imposing dis-
12 Similarly, today a reputation for litigiousness can deter civil suits against a de-
fendant.
13 Ernest van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 123, 135 (1978)
(noting that "[t]o be deterrent, sentences must be predictable, and the relevant pre-
diction refers to the time that actually must be served[,]" and that parole should
therefore be abolished); see also Michele H. Kalstein et al., Calculating Injustice: The
Fixation on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 602-03
(1992) ("Without parole, the Commission reasoned, criminals would know the length
of a sentence, and would therefore understand the precise costs of committing a
crime. Accordingly, abolishing parole would increase the certainty, and thus the de-
terrent effect of punishment.").
14 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987-2040 (1984).
15 See Thomas J. Meier, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture of
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
377, 379-80 (1993) (citing uniformity, honesty, and proportionality as the principal
goals of the Act).
16 See Eric P. Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to Eliminate Sen-
tencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 187,
188-92 (discussing the evolution of sentencing reform and the enactment of the 1984
Act); Sean Piccoli, Bill Aims to Equalize Sentencing for Cocaine, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
7, 1995, at A4 (describing the current law under which five grams of crack cocaine
qualifies a defendant as a dealer and mandates a five-year sentence, whereas it takes
500 grams of powder cocaine to qualify a defendant for a nonmanditory five-year
sentence).
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parate sentences on those who committed similar crimes. 7
In contrast, the imposition of a compensatory scheme represents a far
more impersonal, objective, and uniform system of rules. Courts award
compensatory damages on the basis of a universal standard that is valued
similarly by all members of the social group: money or its equivalent. A
system of compensation favors objectivity because it depends on the val-
ues that society attaches to injuries, not on the personal value that victims
attach to injuries.'" Employing a compensatory system leads to uniform
rules governing wrongdoing because it is transaction-oriented rather than
person-oriented.'9
Objectifying and unifying the applicability of the law, however, is not
without a price. A law before which all persons are equal loses its hu-
manity and passion; it rests on ignoring personal traits and focuses in-
stead on a broad-based, generalized model of a human being. Victims
today thus face a highly impersonal legal system that does not allow them
to affect the punishment of those who wronged them. The law of torts,
which constitutes a victim's only recourse, is based on a far more objec-
tive scheme for determining liability, and offers compensation only for
particular kinds of injury. Therefore, recovery for injuries does not al-
ways reduce the rage that victims experience, nor does it provide the ca-
tharsis associated with revenge.20
B. The Ascent of Money and Tort Compensation
The immense value that our society places on money further distin-
guishes modern law from medieval England's law of revenge. When Pro-
fessor Seipp described to me the medieval rule that revenge and compen-
sation were mutually exclusive remedies, I expected victims to prefer
compensation. Professor Seipp, however, explained how differently a
thirteenth century victim might react. Rich victims would choose re-
17 "Just punishment notions abhor the unfairness of a sentence that depends more
on sentencing authority than on the crime or on the offender's culpability." Paul H.
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987).
18 A theory of "objective liability" under which only particular kinds of harm war-
rant recovery constitutes an important part of the civil paradigm. See Kenneth Mann,
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101
YALE L.J. 1795, 1812-13 (1992).
19 I am indebted to Professor Robert Meisner for this distinction.
20 As my colleague Professor Alan Feld, Professor of Law, Boston University, sug-
gests, the tension between revenge and compensation forms an integral part of the
conflict present in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice. Although Shylock lived in
twelfth century Venice, the Italians were representative of the British in Shake-
speare's time. Attitudes in that era more closely resembled those prevalent today
than those common in medieval England. Whereas Shylock demanded his right to
revenge, the merchants-and the judicial system they controlled-recognized his
right only to compensation.
[Vol. 76:89
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venge. Poor victims would choose revenge because not many wrongdoers
were wealthy enough to compensate for their wrongs. Further, a victim's
community's strong approval of revenge would influence the victim and
result in more cases of cruel punishment and fewer cases of monetary
damages.
Today, the state's exclusive right to prosecute wrongdoers makes it eas-
ier for victims to sue for damages without incurring the disdain or wrath
of their communities.21 Monetary damages can also constitute the only
kind of punishment in cases involving corporate defendants and similar
legal entities.22 It is difficult to view such entities as either victims or
wrongdoers. Applied to such nonhuman defendants, revenge must take
the form of compensation.
In contrast to revenge, remedies in the form of compensation provide
uniformity. As discussed above, money does not distinguish among vic-
tims and wrongdoers, but serves to equalize people, their actions, and the
consequences under the law.23
In short, revenge and compensation represent the differences between
the law meted out by individuals and their close community on the one
hand, and the law meted out by the state on the other; between Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft;24 between focusing on the individual parties and
21 Courts have also expanded suits for damages by creating for victims implied
private rights of action derived from criminal statutes. For example, reckless driving
not only might warrant a fine, but might also create a cause of action for an injured
party if the recklessness causes an injury. Similarly, Rule lOb-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was used by the courts as a basis for implied rights of action by
the victims of securities frauds.
22 Shifting accountability from individuals to the "corporate personality" poses
problems in imposing sanctions for criminal behavior by corporations. See ROBERT
C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 676 (1986) ("Obviously, there is a problem in deciding
when a corporation might be deemed to have had a criminal intent.., corporations as
such cannot be put in jail. Criminal sanctions for misconduct by corporate agents
must be imposed in other ways. Determining the best way is very difficult.").
23 It is not surprising that in Roman law compensation played a far greater role
than criminal punishment and that in medieval England the reverse was true. Rome
was an empire with a mobile society, which required a uniform law, well known by
travelling strangers who would interact in trade.
Medieval English common law procedure did, however, offer foreign merchants a
measure of protection against a hostile community forum through the device of a
"mixed jury," in which half the members shared the merchant's country of origin.
E.g., Simon Jolly, 21 J. LAW & Soc'Y 570 (1994) (reviewing MARIANNE CONSTABLE,
THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITI-
ZENSHIP, LAW AND KNOWLEDGE (1994)). This practice persisted for nearly six centu-
ries, from the Carta Mercatoria of 1303 to its abolition in 1870, when the device
seemed to have outlived its usefulness. Jolly notes that "[Ms. Constable] traces the
move from a law of custom, society, and of belonging to a law of the state, a law of the
land, a law of alienation." Id.
24 "Gemeinschaft" means "community, society," whereas "Gesellschaft" means
19961
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focusing on the action or transaction; between the law of small societies
and the law of large, mobile, and diverse societies. A law designed to
compensate victims is more impersonal, objective, uniform, and predict-
able than a law based on victims' right to exact vengeance.
III. THE DESIRE FOR REVENGE LIVES ON: MODERN REVENGE-
BASED PRINICPLES
Even though we seem to strive towards objective, uniform, and predict-
able compensatory laws, we have retained something from the past.
Even today compensation and revenge duel for recognition.
On the one hand, the principles of the rule of law rather than the rule
of man still predominate. Courts refused for many years to award com-
pensation for non-quantifiable, subjective, victim-oriented sanctions such
as pain and suffering. Many courts still formally deny compensation in
criminal actions.2 5 On the other hand, the separation between criminal
and compensatory sanctions is far from complete. Compensation for
many torts has come to include punitive damages,26 among others, on the
ground that victim-consumers need a powerful tool to protect themselves
against powerful suppliers,27 and on the ground that punitive damage
awards may have a healing effect on the victim beyond that which com-
"organization, corporation." DORA VON BESELER & BARBARA JACOBS-WOSTEFELD,
LAW DICTIONARY, GERMAN-ENGLISH 668, 703 (4th ed. 1991).
25 According to the traditional and "formal position" of courts and many commen-
tators, compensation for the victim is an inappropriate punishment for a criminal of-
fense because such an offense constitutes an affront to society as a whole. Criminal
laws should vindicate the dignity of the state, not that of the individual. See Alan T.
Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Crimi-
nal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52, 54 n.13 (1982).
26 During the middle of this century, legislative use of punitive damages increased
dramatically. This increase was due at least in part to the rise of the utilitarian theory
of jurisprudence. Legislatures began to recognize the deterrent effect of monetary
sanctions and to employ such sanctions in civil cases. Mann, supra note 18, at 1844-
47.
The practice of awarding punitive damages for an injury has generated substantial
debate. Punitive damages can be unfair or discriminatory in some cases. They may
deter those who can pay, but can inflict pain on those with limited means. Although
courts can attempt to limit socioeconomic bias by considering each wrongdoer's finan-
cial resources, "there will always be a bankrupt population for whom the only answer
is imprisonment." Id. at 1872.
27 Concern for society's weaker individuals and the desire to protect them from
stronger actors support the award of punitive damages. Arguably, the consumer has
little control over the safety of mass-marketed products and services. Punitive dam-
ages are a method of protecting vulnerable consumers against abuses of dominant
actors. Charles P. Kindregan & Edward M. Swartz, The Assault on the Captive Con-
sumer: Emasculating the Common Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST. MA-
RY'S L.J. 673, 676-79 (1987) (defending our current system of torts in general).
[Vol. 76:89
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pensatory damages would effect. This is the language of revenge.' In
addition, recent jurisprudence leans toward accepting restitutive sanc-
tions in many criminal contexts. 29 In some cases, courts have also al-
lowed compensation for victims' pain and suffering,3" although Congress
is attempting to impose a cap on such awards.3'
There are other developments toward revenge-based rights. Recent
statutes and judicial decisions have allowed, and sometimes encouraged,
victims to get involved at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings.
Instead of limiting the considerations in sentencing proceedings to the
wrongdoer's personal circumstances, courts and legislatures are allowing
victims and their families to express their feelings and demand revenge or
suggest leniency. Courts take such sentiments into account in sentencing
wrongdoers.3 2
28 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 KAN. L.
REV. 39, 50-51 (1994) (arguing that compensation and punitive tort sanctions may
serve victims' needs for dignity, respect, empowerment, closure, and faith in the sys-
tem).
29 Many sentencing proposals like the Model Penal Code and the Model Sentenc-
ing Act support restitution to victims of crimes. A substantial number of criminal
statutes offer restitution and many administrative agencies use restitution programs.
See Harland, supra note 25, at 55-56. In fact, "the idea that restitutive sanctions
should be woven into the fabric of the penal system is virtually unopposed in recent
debate." Id. at 119-20.
30 Pain and suffering awards have triggered much debate. Critics of the current
system argue that large pain and suffering awards contribute to the rising cost of in-
surance and litigation and to an increasing fear of liability, which threatens the econo-
my. Others argue that given the uncertainty of data on the prevalence and aggregate
costs of frivolous or fraudulent suits, remedial reform of the current tort system could
be counterproductive. See W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis": A
Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 459, 505-06, 526-27 (1992)
(suggesting that reformers lack hard data to support their positions). The failure of
some courts to ignore statutory caps on pain and suffering awards has provoked seri-
ous criticism on the ground that "non-pecuniary" damages are less "estimable." See,
e.g., Kindregan & Swartz, supra note 27, at 703 ("By what twist of logic is the loss of
the very essence of life given less importance than the loss of money?").
31 Legitimizing such awards requires empathy, and juries seem to feel such empa-
thy to a greater extent than do members of Congress.
32 Such "victim impact statements" have been criticized as well as applauded.
Consider, for example, the role of such statements in the recent sentencing of Colin
Ferguson, who was convicted of murdering and injuring passengers on a commuter
train in suburban New York. See, e.g., All Things Considered (National Public Radio
broadcast, Mar. 25, 1995) (noting that the judge told survivors of the Ferguson attack
that "he was very moved by their statements," but also commenting that "[i]t is un-
clear if they affected his sentence").
Reactions to the use of these statements differ. One critic noted that:
The most basic requirement of the rule of law is that judges and juries must be
personally impartial, that they can't decide even close cases on the basis of their
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The debate surrounding such practices echoes the arguments concern-
ing the right to revenge. Some argue that these practices misrepresent
the criminal justice system as requiring the accused to prove their inno-
cence."3 Others argue that it may be "good for society that [the public]
can hear what the [victim's] family goes through." 4 In addition, a victim
impact statement may help the victim by providing a "catharsis for the
surviving victim or his family.""5 These new practices talk the language
of the victims' right to vengeance, and recognize that sentencing is far
more personal and subjective than people usually acknowledge."6 Thus,
today we allow victims to claim revenge, but only in the form of money
and only with the approval of the court.3 7
IV. THE REASONS FOR RETENTION AND REVIVAL OF REVENGE-
BASED PRINCIPLES
A. The Rise of Community Life
One explanation for the revival of the right to vengeance is that the
relationship of individuals to their communities has recently changed. A
victim's right to vengeance is not entirely personal but communitarian,
representing the mores of a close social group, such as the family, tribe,
village, or religious group. The moral standards of those who live in such
environments usually depend on, and are influenced by, the group. These
standards include the choice of sanctions, the importance of the right to
vengeance, and how this right should be exercised." In contrast, those
sympathy or distaste for one party or another. Yet victim impact statements,
when presented orally without the possibility of rational evaluation, guarantee
that trials will degenerate into lawless emotionalism.
Editorial, Victim Justice, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1995, at 9. In contrast, one sup-
porter felt that:
[Although] care should be taken to avoid inflammatory and irrelevant testimony
... the participation of victims at the post-conviction stage is a healthy develop-
ment. It provides a catharsis for the surviving victim or his family, allowing those
who have suffered to be heard and giving a sentencing judge some information to
balance that submitted by the offender.
Editorial, The Victims Have Their Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at A22. See gener-
ally Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Re-
venge? 75 B.U. L. REV. 187 (1995).
33 See All Things Considered, supra note 32 (statement of Ellen Semmel).
3" Id. (statement of Ann Reed).
a5 The Victims Have Their Say, supra note 32, at A22.
36 In fact, even in the past, sentencing was more subjective than a finding of guilt
or innocence because it depended on the personal circumstances of the accused.
37 In order to obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
both violated legal norms and acted "outrageously." Kindregan & Swartz, supra note
27, at 696.
38 See All Things Considered, supra note 32 (statement of George Fletcher) (sug-
gesting that "[t]he purpose of the criminal trial is to determine whether the defendant
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who live in larger communities or travel regularly are less influenced by
any tightly knit group and are likely to be more individualistic and to
make such decisions on their own.
The re-emergence of vengeance rights may be related to the current
movement: (1) to decentralize political power, the workplace, and the
cultural environment; (2) to transfer power from the national level to the
states, localities, communities, and families; and (3) to resurrect the small
community, both in our minds and in reality. Television and the informa-
tion highway allow members of this new "community" to interact. Televi-
sion has enabled millions to become involved in criminal trials and to
experience the sense of community that personalizes relationships, em-
phasizes each citizen's role in trials, and especially, personalizes punish-
ment."a The televised "town meetings" that politicians conduct send the
same emotional message. In addition, the public format may produce
pressure to listen to victims. The access of wrongdoers to television and
the publicity given to their stories can result in a demand for equal time
to the victims and their families, to ensure a more balanced picture for
the audience.4' That vision of balance may be then carried to court pro-
ceedings. The movement to smaller communities, physical or televised,
and the longing for a sense of belonging, can explain the expansion of
individuals' right to vengeance in criminal sanctioning. The pressure to
resuscitate "family values" and community involvement, and to return
power to the states and local governments, re-legitimizes seeking ven-
geance against those who threaten the peace, the family, and the home.
B. The Reduction in Mobility
Another possible explanation for the resurgence of revenge-based
rights lies in the fundamental shift in mobility in recent years. Until re-
cently, the United States was a mobile society; people moved to find jobs
and a better life. However, the information revolution now allows nu-
merous individuals to work at home and to change jobs without physical-
ly relocating. This trend toward work at home is strengthened by con-
is guilty, to punish the defendant if he or she is guilty, but also to provide an opportu-
nity for victims to reintegrate themselves in society and to feel once again that they
are equal citizens with everyone else").
39 Attorneys have recognized television's pervasiveness and possibly harmful effect
on juror impartiality. During jury selection in the O.J. Simpson trial, potential jurors
were urged to avoid watching television or reading newspapers for fear that exposure
to the news would bias them. E.g., Democracy on trial, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 12,
1994, at 117.
40 The Victims Have Their Say, supra note 32, at A22 ("[T]he killer ... was on
television every day for weeks portraying himself as the injured party and belittling
the testimony of those who had been shot. He spent five hours addressing the court
during pre-sentence proceedings.., it was only right, and satisfying, to let the victims
and their families also have their say.").
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cerns over costs and the environmental hazards of auto-transportation,
and by the increasing number of families consisting of two working par-
ents who wish to spend more time with their children. As a result, the
trend will probably continue. Reduction in mobility is likely to strength-
en the adherence to communal mores, and accompanying revenge-based
rights.
C. The Concern for the Victims' Feelings
A third explanation for the retention and strength of the vengeance-
based system stems from a desire to aid the victims of crime. Just as
allowing victims a voice in sentencing personalizes sanctions, punishing in
a very personalized way gives a sense of satisfaction and empowerment to
the victims. Crimes can be viewed as inflicting a "moral injury" that de-
values the victims.4" Revenge-like remedies can restore the victims' value
in their own eyes and in the eyes of others.42 For example, some states, as
well as Canada and Great Britain, are experimenting with ways of mak-
ing a rapist, through therapy, re-live his crime from the victim's point of
view.4" This method of punishment helps restore the victim's status."
Thus, revenge-like punishment can in some sense repair the violation of
personal integrity that crime creates.
D. Inefficiencies of Law Enforcement and Return to Self-Help
Our society's move toward rights of vengeance may also result in part
from lack of faith in our law enforcement system, and its perceived failure
to administer justice efficiently. During the Middle Ages courts could
only enforce a person's rights if the accused chose to appear before
them. 45 Revenge was thus a victim's method of self-help. Today, victims
may also feel that the system has failed them, and that it affords protec-
tion only to the accused. A victim who has suffered from a crime criti-
cizes the system for entertaining the possibility that the accused is inno-
cent:
41 Hampton, supra note 3, at 1685.
42 Although those who argue for retribution distinguish retribution from revenge
because revenge implies "hate," id. at 1691 n.49, retributive remedies reflect the law
of revenge in their concern for the victim's rights.
4 Id. at 1689 (discussing such "innovative punishment programs").
4 Id at 1690.
[T]he state, in the victim's name, forces the rapist to undergo an experience that,
even while never denying his own dignity as a person, insists that he experience
the rape from the victim's point of view. By doing so, not only does the state
confirm the victim's importance, but it also defeats the rapist's claim to mastery
by putting him in a position where he must, through his imagination, become her,
and suffer as if he were her.
Id.
45 Seipp, supra note 1, at 64.
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A good deal of my frustration stemmed from the feeling that, as a
crime victim, I was an outsider to the criminal justice system... I
have witnessed how the humanity of the homicide victim is lost as
they are [sic] reduced to a one-dimensional piece of evidence that is
shown to the jury and then put aside.46
Crime victims see the system as unreasonably, and perhaps cold-heart-
edly, favoring defendants. This adds to their desire to see those who are
convicted punished severely. If victims feel that the larger community,
the state, has failed them, they may turn to their communities and revert
to the system of self-help that the common law replaced.
E. The Schism Between the "Haves" and "Have Nots"
The recent growing schism between the "haves" and "have nots" in
American society may provide yet another explanation for the re-
emergence of the system of vengeance. In the Middle Ages, most wrong-
doers were quite poor. Today, although the criminal wrongdoer (espe-
cially the violent one) may be poor, the civil defendant (whether a corpo-
ration or an individual) may be quite wealthy, possessing sufficient funds
or insurance coverage with which to pay compensation. 47 As we return to
the norms of the past, the schism between poor and rich wrongdoers can
result in bifurcation of punishment.
As such, victims' right of vengeance will apply to poor wrongdoers.
The wrongdoers will suffer either very serious or very lenient punish-
ments, depending on the victims and their communities.4 The law, as
applied to them, will be more subjective and less uniform. The poor will
be punished according to the victims they hurt.
In contrast, wealthy tortfeasors will uniformly pay the same damages
for similar wrongs, regardless of the mores of the victims or their commu-
nities. Unlike the developments in criminal law, there are pressures to
46 Steve Baker, Justice Not Revenge: A Crime Victim's Perspective on Capital Pun-
ishment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 339, 340 (1992).
47 The contemporary assertion of ethnic, cultural, and racial group identities con-
trasts with the traditional notion of the "melting pot," and has resulted in disintegra-
tion of American society. We are witnessing a counter-assertion by the "haves," the
traditional power-holders in defense of their positions. Feelings of anger and revenge
accompany this phenomenon. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DisUNITING
OF AMERICA 28 (1992) ("The smelting pot... had, unmistakably and inescapably, an
Anglocentric flavor. For better or worse, the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition
.. provided the standard to which other immigrant nationalities were expected to
conform, the matrix into which they would be assimilated.").
48 In the trial of four Los Angeles police officers accused of beating Rodney King,
a jury in prosperous Simi Valley, California, arguably applied its community percep-
tion that police violence may be understandable, even occasionally justified. A differ-
ent jury, drawn from urban Los Angeles, returned a far less favorable verdict, influ-
enced perhaps by a less indulgent attitude toward police conduct.
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limit punitive damages in tort law, and such limits will probably be im-
posed. Wrongdoers in civil cases will therefore be punished according to
the wrongful acts that they committed, and the laws applicable to them
will be impersonal, objective, and uniform. The wrongdoers in criminal
cases will be subject to more personal, subjective, and non-uniform laws.
Thus, the thirteenth century is still with us. We are grateful to Profes-
sor Seipp for the lessons he brings from the past. These lessons help
heighten our awareness and understanding of the present.
